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An ongoing effort, exemplified though happily not exhausted in the work of B. K. 
Matilal, is to present the best of classical Indian philosophy in a way that speaks to 
contemporary philosophical concerns, while still being historically and philologi-
cally responsible. Epistemology in Classical India: The Knowledge Sources of the 
Nyāya School by Stephen Phillips is expressly this kind of work. Phillips begins by 
explaining that his book is “for philosophers and students of philosophy, not for spe-
cialists in classical Indian thought” (p. 1). His project is to engage with a range of 
classical texts and contemporary philosophy, in order to offer the Nyāya theory of 
knowledge as a coherent system. A welcome feature of his introduction is a defense 
of this kind of study. He appeals to the nature of philosophical practice in Nyāya, 
which, over the centuries, defends and develops its central claims, its siddhāntas. 
Given this, specific Naiyāyikas speak not so much as individuals but as members of 
the tradition. “Thus,” Phillips claims, “to try to find a single coherent theory, which is 
admittedly an abstraction from a long series of texts, is in accord with the dominant 
attitude within Nyāya itself” (p. 1).
We should not misunderstand Phillips’ claim about the intended audience and 
think that Epistemology in Classical India is merely introductory and of little use to 
specialists in Indian thought. This book is, in effect, the distilled, coherent summary 
of decades of Phillips’ work on Nyāya, and on Indian epistemology more generally. 
This alone makes it relevant to those of us who work in Indian philosophy. When 
warranted, he also contends with views put forth by leading scholars, advancing the 
conversation on important matters of interpretation. The last chapter of the book of-
fers the creative and philosophically sensitive argument that Nyāya’s epistemological 
system avoids many problems recognized in contemporary thought, and is therefore 
indeed worthy of philosophical consideration. It is not merely a summary of earlier 
findings but a contribution to the philosophical study of Indian thought.
The book is well structured to support its overall project. It is admirably concise 
and indeed short. The meat of the book, sans appendixes and supporting materials, 
is a little over one hundred pages. The endnotes cite relevant primary and secondary 
literature, filling out the streamlined discussion within the body of the text. In this 
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way, the book can serve as the basis of a useful program of study. One can, with great 
profit and without investing an inordinate amount of time, read Phillips’ text, gaining 
a sense of Nyāya as a developed system, and, where desired, follow up on the litera-
ture within the notes, engaging more closely with relevant primary and secondary 
materials. This would be an ideal way, I opine, for a student or nonspecialist scholar 
to become proficient in Nyāya epistemology. The endnotes also serve to prevent a 
not uncommon mode of presentation of the Indian schools for nonspecialists as en-
tirely disengaged from source texts. Phillips’ account of Nyāya as a system of thought 
is no Platonic form, pristinely floating in heaven and divorced from the muddy ground 
of textual engagement. Even where he has to think creatively about how Nyāya 
would engage with problems that were not explicitly handled in the tradition, he 
looks for proof texts or at least footholds in the original thinkers by which he may 
ascend to constructive interpretation.
Nyāya Epistemology in Summary
Chapter 1 starts with a short conceptual and historical introduction to Nyāya within 
the Indian philosophical scene. The only quibble I would have with his short over-
view is the unqualified characterization of Vaiśeṣika as an atheistic tradition (p. 4). 
Though the sūtrakāra may have had no use for God, as is well known, Praśastapāda 
and subsequent Vaiśeṣikas do give a place of privilege to Īśvara, not only as the ini-
tiator of the creation cycles, but also as the overseer of the functioning of karma. 
Given Phillips’ own principle of system, noted above, which looks to the contours of 
the mature school and avoids an “originalist” bias that sees post-sūtra developments 
as mere external accretions to the “real” holdings of the school, he could have better 
contextualized the place of theism in Vaiśeṣika.
The bulk of chapter 1 is, in any case, a systematic overview of Nyāya’s theory of 
knowledge. Chapter 2 continues this, focusing on the notion of certification or reflec-
tive justification, the highest grade of positive epistemic status that Nyāya allows for 
cognition. In summary, Phillips’ systemization of Nyāya’s epistemology is as follows: 
There are two levels of knowledge (pramā, “veridical cognition”). Ground-level “raw 
animal knowledge” (p. 5) is unreflective and consists in the possession of veridical 
cognition owing to the operation of a knowledge source (pramāṇa, identified as 
 perception, inference, analogy, and testimony). The normative status of ground-level 
cognition is governed by externalist/reliabilist considerations. Being linked to the 
truth by functioning knowledge sources is enough for us to have knowledge, whether 
or not we have reflected on it at all.
The second level of knowledge is “self-consciously certified.”1 Factors like inter-
nal doubt or adversarial challenge trigger such self-conscious reflection and certifica-
tion, which (typically) attempts to trace the causal origin of a doubtful cognition to a 
genuine knowledge source. The normative status of certified knowledge is governed 
by internalist considerations. One must consciously attend to the status of the cogni-
tion in question, identifying good reasons in support of it, which may serve to indi-
cate that it is indeed pramāṇa-born. Importantly, as Phillips notes, certified knowledge 
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is entirely within the province of knowledge sources, as certification depends on the 
use of inference and, when needed, other pramāṇas (e.g., I may use my own percep-
tion and inference to certify my impression that a particular person is dishonest, but 
I may also include the testimony of others as solid evidence).
At this second level, Nyāya appeals to what Phillips calls “modest foundational-
ism” (p. 14), in that second-level reflective inquiry comes to an end by demonstrating 
either that a particular cognition is or is not pramāṇa-generated or (by using suppo-
sitional reasoning, tarka) that a particular doubt or challenge to belief is unworthy of 
being taken seriously, thereby bumping the individual back down to ground-level 
cognitive trust. Here, the chain of explanation comes to an end — again, a “modest” 
end, since good reasons for doubt could indeed bring this soft foundation into ques-
tion and trigger further review. But in the absence of such reasons, we stop here (this 
process is summarized on pp. 18–19). Phillips cogently notes that unlike Cartesian 
foundationalism, Nyāya’s foundations serve as the final step of philosophical inves-
tigation. We only look for them when there is a problem, and when we find them we 
stop looking and return to our standard default trust, as illustrated by Nyāya’s famous 
metaphor of the lamp (NS 2.1.19, cited by Phillips on p. 18). While a lamp illumines 
other objects, it may be an object of knowledge should we seek to find it. So, too, 
may we make our own cognitions objects of knowledge if we desire to review and 
confirm them.
Phillips argues that this modest foundationalism is allied with a coherentism in 
that any information appealed to in second-order certification must come from a rich 
background of putatively pramāṇa-generated knowledge — this is ultimately all we 
have to appeal to. While he does not call attention to it, Phillips could have noted 
two further coherentist elements of Nyāya: (1) practically any such putative pramāṇa-
generated knowledge is in principle capable of being reviewed and certified itself,2 
and (2) the mechanism of doubt and cognitive review is governed by negative coher-
ence, violation of which triggers doubt and the move to reflective certification.3
One could question whether Phillips needs to invoke both modest foundational-
ism and coherentism to describe what is basically the same phenomenon: in the act 
of certification, we appeal to the putative deliverances of other pramāṇas (along with 
tarka, which is technically not a pramāṇa, but its assistant4) to evaluate the status of 
the cognition under review, and unless there is legitimate doubt about this further 
pramāṇa, the chain of explanation ends there. Phillips himself suggests that Nyāya’s 
modest foundationalism protects it from the charge of circular reasoning that besets 
coherentism: “there are just certain (quasi-) basic beliefs and not simply a circle of 
mutually supporting opinions” (p. 19). We may note that Nyāya’s “modest” founda-
tionalism (later called “fallible foundations” and unpacked on pp. 20–23) simply 
amounts to default trust in unblemished presentational awareness (anubhava) of any 
kind, and is not a distinctive feature of second-level, certificational knowledge. My 
seeing a friend down the hall is foundational knowledge, which may be appealed to 
in support of other beliefs, to the degree that it has not been infected by legitimate 
doubt. Thus, though Phillips first invokes modest foundationalism in the context of 
second-level cognitive review and certificational knowledge (p. 14), he underscores 
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the fact that it applies to both levels of knowledge. The basicality of “foundational” 
belief or cognition for Nyāya is merely the default presumption of innocence ac-
corded to any apparently blemish-free cognition. It is the property of all beliefs that 
are not rejected, dubious, or otherwise slated for review. To answer the question at 
the head of this paragraph, I do think that that the two designations help underscore 
separate features of Nyāya’s second-level cognitive review: the foundationalism 
highlights the default trust in putative deliverances of pramāṇas, which ends the jus-
tificational regress in the absence of reasons for doubt, while the coherentism under-
scores the fact that in cognitive review we have nothing to appeal to outside the 
putative deliverances of pramāṇas.
A final internalist feature of Nyāya epistemology discussed by Phillips is a con-
cern with “excellences” (guṇas) and “faults” (doṣas), a concern that arises in the 
context of cognitive review (pp. 23–24). These two are taken to be indicators of 
whether a cognition is truly the product of pramāṇas or not. We look to excellences 
and faults as respective indicators of both. For example, regarding a testimonial cog-
nition, Jayanta suggests that one excellence is the benevolence of the testifier, while 
a fault would be her deceitful nature.
In short, then, for Phillips, Nyāya is externalist insofar as the operations of genu-
ine knowledge sources provide us with ground-level “animal” knowledge (pramāṇa-
born cognition) with no need for reflection. It is (moderately) foundationalist insofar 
as it allows blemish-free presentational cognition to serve as the stopping point of 
reflective inquiry. It is internalist insofar as second-level “certificational” knowledge 
requires conscious reflection and inferential support. It is coherentist insofar as cog-
nitive review must appeal to the resources of other putatively pramāṇa-born cogni-
tions. On the whole, Phillips’ systemization of Nyāya is successful and is an advance, 
synthesizing the essentials of Nyāya thought, which has been developed in bits and 
pieces by various Nyāya scholars (including himself ). 5
Knowledge Sources
The centrality of knowledge sources in both unreflective and certified knowledge 
having been established, chapters 3 through 6 focus on Nyāya’s four recognized 
sources of knowledge: perception, inference, analogy, and testimony, respectively. 
Discussing Nyāya’s view of perception as a phenomenally and conceptually rich 
capacity to gain information about a real external world, chapter 3 takes the reader 
through the most important Nyāya arguments (contra Yogācāra Buddhists, and in 
 dialogue with Mīmāṁsakas) that concept-laden perception simply is perception, a 
taking in of the world, and is not an artificial mental imposition on what is in fact 
conceptually empty sensation. Phillips shows that the much-celebrated nirvikalpaka 
pratyakṣa plays no phenomenological role for Nyāya and is at most a theoretical 
posit to account for our ability to glean propositional content from the outside world: 
perception is fundamentally the seeing of some object(s) as qualified by some prop-
erty (or properties). Usually such properties are correlated with concepts held in the 
memory of the perceiver, who deploys them in the act of perception (“That’s a tree,” 
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where some x is seen as qualified by the predication content “tree”). But in some 
cases (like one’s first experience of a previously unknown animal) we must have the 
capacity to glean concepts from the outside world directly, without an intervening 
deployment of a concept stored in memory.
Ironically, perhaps, Nyāya’s acceptance of non-conceptual perception is thus 
meant to support the view that our perceptually relevant concepts ultimately come 
“from the outside” — serving the opposite role of that given to non-conceptual per-
ception by its Buddhist champions. Phillips’ further discussions of recognition, per-
ceptual error, and apperception underscore just how powerful Nyāya takes perception 
to be: we have the capacity to perceptually recognize an occurrently perceived ob-
ject as the same object seen yesterday. We have the capacity to perceive absences, 
which, like recognition, are informed by, but are not reducible to, the memory of 
previously experienced objects. And it is because of this profound capacity of per-
ception to directly apprehend things, properties, our own mental states (through ap-
perception, a subspecies of perception proper), substances, and indeed relationships 
of various sorts6 that Nyāya empiricism, as Phillips points out, does not collapse into 
idealism, as have other empiricisms, both Indian and European (p. 44).
Keeping with the focus of the book, Phillips’ discussion of inference (chapter 4) 
avoids excursions into classical Indian debate theory and other such topics, focusing 
on the way in which inference is an epistemic faculty, both for individuals as knowers 
and in the social dimension, where good arguments presented by others must be 
taken seriously since they are, in some way, normatively binding. Discussing the 
structure of inference, Phillips illustrates the main articulations by Nyāya as well as 
influential Buddhist logicians, while arguing that, for Nyāya at least, inferential pro-
cedure goes beyond case-based reasoning, requiring the knowledge and application 
of general rules of inference (p. 60). He also illustrates the way in which the impor-
tant notion of upādhi, “inferential undercutter,” informs Nyāya’s theory of inference. 
An upādhi is a property that pervades the sādhya or thing to be proven in an infer-
ence, but that does not in fact pervade the hetu or prover put forth. For example, 
someone whose only experience of fire is of that which is made from wet or green 
lumber would think that wherever there is fire, there must be smoke. But in truth, 
while green or wet fuel pervades smoke, it does not pervade fire; only through the 
influence of the upādhi of “having wet or green fuel” can fire be a prover of smoke. 
Phillips calls attention to the way in which Gaṅgeśa’s theory of upādhis connects to 
his broader approach to epistemic warrant. While, pace skeptical claims, someone 
need not ferret out any and all potential upādhis before one can make a warranted 
inference, she must be attentive to possible upādhis for which there is some evi-
dence. Even a suspected upādhi is enough to undermine an inference.
Phillips concludes by explaining, among other things, the rationale for Nyāya’s 
controversial use of inference based on negative correlation, and, usefully, by provid-
ing a handful of important examples of the actual inferences Nyāya employs in sup-
port of contested metaphysical issues (the self, God, and the possibility of liberation).
Analogy (chapter 5) has always been the outlier among the pramāṇas, having 
both a severely restricted scope and a convoluted causal sequence. While explaining 
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and endorsing the Nyāya account of analogy as an irreducible pramāṇa (p. 78), Phil-
lips spends more time on tangentially related — but, in this reader’s opinion, more 
interesting — issues like the ways in which Nyāya and other Indian schools account 
for the referential and suggestive power of words. At the same time, given that Phil-
lips is acting not only as a faithful historian but in many ways a creative and sympa-
thetic Nyāya systematizer, it would have been helpful if, given the strangeness of 
analogy, which, as he notes, led it to be attacked on many sides and abandoned by 
the innovative Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña, he had delved more fully into the criticisms 
and provided a fuller defense (or conversely, reasons why Nyāya should in fact aban-
don it).7 In the spirit of Phillips’ project, I would suggest that it should be jettisoned 
as a full-fledged pramāṇa. Indeed, I would argue that in the standard story that is told, 
analogy itself is a superfluous part of the cognitive sequence. The stock example 
 involves someone’s learning that the word gavaya refers to water buffalo, on (1) the 
testimony that a gavaya looks like a cow, and (2) later, upon seeing something that 
looks like a cow, realizing that the term gavaya refers to the thing in view, a water 
buffalo (Phillips’ summary is on p. 75). The analogy is between the referent of gavaya 
and a cow, and the knowledge of this analogy allows one to recognize and know that 
the thing in view is called a gavaya.
To illustrate why analogy itself is superfluous in this kind of knowledge, we can 
imagine a case where someone who knows little about American football is told 
“people who stand on the sidelines of a football game, leading songs, dancing, and 
waving pom-poms are called ‘cheerleaders.’ ” The same person later goes to a foot-
ball game, sees the cheerleaders, and remarks to himself “those are the people called 
‘cheerleaders.’ ” In this case, there is no analogy employed to assist comprehension; 
the person is simply provided with characteristics or lakṣaṇa that indicate cheer-
leaders. Still, the process is otherwise identical to the case of the water buffalo: one 
is introduced to a name and given a description of its proper referents by a competent 
language user. He then comes to realize firsthand that the name applies to this par-
ticular kind of thing through current experience of the thing in question coupled with 
recollection of the distinguishing characteristics. If analogy is really constitutive of 
one of the pramāṇas, then in the cheerleader case would we need a fifth pramāṇa, 
which does not rely on analogy, but still engenders knowledge of the relationship 
between a name and a particular class of referents? The analogy at work in Nyāya’s 
example of the water buffalo is thus incidental, if the real issue at hand is the under-
standing of the relation between terms and their referents.
So much for analogy itself. But do we still need a special pramāṇa for this kind 
of knowledge of meaning or reference? I would say no. We can take the first level of 
knowledge in these sorts of stories, that of a term’s general use, which is provided by 
an authoritative language user, to be testimonial, like other instances of definitional 
knowledge. The second level of knowledge, in this example the recognition that 
“these specific people are cheerleaders,” which occurs upon seeing actual cheer-
leaders, could be a token of perceptual knowledge, which merely accords with and 
supports the original testimonial knowledge through a convergence of pramāṇas 
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( pramāṇa-saṁplava). What I knew by testimony has now become reinforced by my 
perceptual experience.8 
We have seen above that Nyāya considers perception often to be richly informed 
by memory, without losing the status of being properly perceptual. Just like per-
ceptual recognition (e.g., “that man is the same one I saw yesterday,” discussed by 
Phillips on pp. 38–41), this, too, could be perception that is informed by memory. In 
any case, taking analogy to be an independent pramāṇa is problematic, and in pursu-
ance of Phillips’ constructive effort, I would suggest that it be either radically refined 
or, better, abandoned.9
The final knowledge source is testimony (chapter 6). Here, Phillips reiterates and 
defends the Nyāya view that the proper attitude toward others’ testimony is default 
trust in the absence of defeaters, not a tentative holding of the information until con-
firmation. As he felicitously puts it, on Nyāya’s account of testimony, “acceptance 
and understanding are normally fused” (p. 86), and to reject this approach would 
deprive us of much that we know (p. 82). Because of this, he notes, testimony pro-
vides the clearest example of Nyāya’s notion of ground-level unreflective knowl-
edge, with the possibility of certification as needed. Phillips then considers the pri-
mary lines of argumentation developed by Nyāya in support of the irreducibility of 
testimony, while noting that many in the Western tradition, which was long skeptical 
and/or reductionistic about testimony as a source of knowledge, have started to em-
brace a view not unlike Nyāya. From here, Phillips guides the reader through the 
major Nyāya positions, in dialogue with other schools, on topics like requirements 
for sentence meaning, the nature of reference, the role of a speaker’s intention in 
disambiguating statements, and the operation of indirect speech. Briefly, but impor-
tantly, he follows Ganeri (1999) by arguing that Nyāya’s philosophy of language, 
though a direct reference theory, has the resources for something akin to Fregean 
Sinn insofar as reference, like perceptual cognition, targets a thing as qualified by a 
qualifier. “The qualifier in a general form may be called a word’s sense” (p. 87).
Nyāya’s Pramāṇa Theory as a Genuine Option
The final chapter argues that Nyāya’s theory of knowledge has the resources to 
deal with various problems and challenges advanced within contemporary analytic 
epistemology. Nyāya avoids the generality problem advanced against contemporary 
reliabilism by (1) defining pramāṇas as successful and thus one hundred percent reli-
able, simplifying the problem of reliability itself, (2) appealing to something akin to 
the notion of pramāṇas as cognitive natural kinds that are commonly recognized in 
ordinary thought and speech (with the exception of analogy — another strike against 
it10), and (3) identifying fundamental causal chains (and, implicitly, appropriate cir-
cumstances of usage) that govern each pramāṇa subtype (pp. 24–30, 44–48, 101).11
Against a host of causal objections to reliabilism, which in common allege that 
even reliable cognitive processes can fail to produce knowledge, since an indivi-
dual may not be personally justified or subjectively rational in trusting them, Phillips 
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argues that Nyāya’s two-tiered epistemology has the capacity to counter the objec-
tions while doing justice to the intuition that motivates them. First, Nyāya can simply 
deny that subjective rationality is necessary for the lower “animal” knowledge. 
Ground-level knowledge simply requires a cognitive faculty that ties one’s cognition 
to the truth (p. 98). This is why, we may add, small children and even higher animals 
could be said to know some things. Still, Nyāya shares the concern for subjective 
rationality, requiring it for the “certificational” portion of epistemological practice. 
This is why someone does not have higher, certified knowledge if she either has no 
access to the functioning of, or a reason to doubt, her reliable cognitive faculty. Still, 
this is not a prerequisite to gain ground-level knowledge from the spontaneous deliv-
erances of knowledge sources.
Regarding the “fake barn country” problem, Phillips has two responses. First, he 
reminds the reader that Nyāya is concerned to identify faults (doṣas) that undermine 
apparently veridical perceptual cognition, including, for example, a medium-sized 
object’s being too far away. Nyāya, he argues, could easily add the following to the 
situation: the presence of various F-looking things that are not Fs within the local 
perceptual environment. Second, he argues that if the cognition of an actual barn is 
informed by the memory “Now that’s a fine barn [compared to others we have been 
seeing]” it is non-veridical since it is misinformed by memory. This second way is less 
helpful. The parenthetical content Phillips provides for the visual experience is really 
immaterial. The fundamental problem brought forth by the fake barn example in-
volves epistemic luck — a person happens to accurately perceive a barn when, in this 
local environment, it could easily have been otherwise without her noticing. The 
cognition is not safe. The bit about memory is really not getting at the main issue. A 
possible third line of response, not mentioned by Phillips in this context (but a  related 
one; see p. 142 n. 39) is Nyāya’s recognition that pramāṇas function in environment-
specific ways. Against the Mīmāṁsā view that the justification-conferring features of 
cognition are entirely internal to it (see note 3 above), Nyāya argues that in unfamil-
iar conditions, even blemish-free veridical cognition may remain doubtful and fail 
to count as knowledge. This could be developed to exclude cases like that of fake 
barn country, which trade on conditions which mimic and yet deviate from ordinary 
environments.
Phillips deals with the new-evil-demon objection by agreeing that the one in 
such a world could, by Nyāya lights, “appea[r] to be justified” (p. 101), trusting the 
misleading semblances of pramāṇas (pramāṇa-ābhāsa). But she has neither knowl-
edge nor certification on the Nyāya schema. The notion of pramāṇa-ābhāsa suggests 
something that is a false but apparently true cognition. Commonly, we only recog-
nize the presence of a pramāṇa-ābhāsa in retrospect, after gaining new information 
that invalidates the previous, apparently trustworthy cognition. The term ābhāsa 
 conveys the notion of a semblance of the real thing, which, in the language of con-
temporary epistemology, allows for some degree of justification, which would allow 
for something like subjective rationality or justification, despite lacking first- and 
 second-order knowledge.
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Directions for Further Research
Closing the final chapter, Phillips identifies a handful of epistemological topics that 
are, in his estimation, weaknesses within the Nyāya system: (1) the lack of a formula 
for determining degrees of warrant,12 (2) an underdeveloped account of the way in 
which disagreement has an impact on justification, and (3) a lack of concern with or 
awareness of a priori knowledge as a distinct category. We will close by considering 
these, along with a further topic that, I think, looms in the background of our attempts 
to try to reconstruct the Nyāya system as informed by contemporary epistemology: 
the apparent lack of a proper concern for agent-centered epistemic normativity. 
 Regarding the a priori I have little to add, as Phillips’ discussion deftly explains 
why Nyāya is indifferent to the idea of a priori knowledge, typically reducing it to 
knowledge of the meaning of words, while also accounting to some degree for why 
this is reasonable given Nyāya’s empiricism, and finally identifying places where 
some resonances with a priori knowledge may be located (including “negative-only” 
inferences).
Regarding degrees of warrant, it is correct that Nyāya may be said to hold a 
“threshold theory” of positive epistemic status, not a “degree theory.” Cognitions are 
either in or out of the privileged circle. And this, to be sure, does seem to conflict 
with the fairly common view that justification or warrant comes in degrees, a posi-
tion supported by reflection on standard epistemic practices.13 I would agree with 
Phillips that Nyāya’s account is underdeveloped. But I would add that Nyāya does 
not deny that we have varying degrees of confidence in cognitions as they manifest 
themselves; the epistemic status of cognition manifests itself with varying force. In 
support of this, we may note that Nyāya holds that cognition that has been certified 
or reinforced by a convergence of pramāṇas is more secure than that which has not. 
Such “reinforced” cognitions are not exactly more prāmāṇya or yathārtha, but they 
are more resistant to doubt. Vātsyāyana (NB 3.2.55; ND 815) thus defends a section 
of the Nyāya-sūtra that repeats topics settled earlier, claiming “As truth is repeatedly 
investigated, it becomes more established.”14 Uddyotakara makes a similar claim in 
the opening to his commentary on NS 1.1.10. But more importantly, Nyāya incorpo-
rates into its theory of doubt (saṁśaya) the fact that cognition strikes us with varying 
degrees of epistemic force, thereby providing the conditions under which cognitions 
within a certain range must be reviewed. Therefore, perhaps the resources for dealing 
with the question of degrees of warrant is not to be found in Nyāya’s conception of 
pramāṇa, which is ultimately disjunctive, relational, and “binary,”15 but, instead, in 
its account of doubt — a central feature of our cognitive lives.16
Given the fact that doubt is so important to Nyāya — it is one of the sixteen cen-
tral topics listed in NS 1.1.1 — and indeed, as it is the trigger that initiates the transi-
tion from ground-level trust in cognition to self-conscious certification and review,17 
I think that it could have been given a fuller treatment by Phillips. I would like to look 
at it briefly, while suggesting how it speaks to both the problem of degrees of warrant 
and the epistemic role of disagreement. The procedure of the Nyāya-sūtra itself 
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 illustrates a somewhat formal approach to doubt as part of a rule-bound discussion 
or debate, often following the following schema: (1) introduction of a philosophical 
topic, (2) elucidation of reasons for doubt in the standard Nyāya position, and (3) 
resolution of the doubt by deployment of pramāṇas and tarka. But despite this, its 
definition of doubt centers on the practice of individual epistemic agents:
Doubt is an unsteady awareness, in want of a distinguishing cognition, produced by 
awareness of common property, of an uncommon property, or by conflicting opinion, 
which are qualified by uncertainty regarding cognition and non-cognition. (NS 1.1.23; 
ND 234)18
Generally, a doubtful cognition is typified as having predication content amenable to 
multiple, incompatible objects, ascribed to a single locus, coupled with an inability 
of the subject to apprehend a property unique to one of the options that would settle 
the case. A stock example of a doubtful cognition is the perceptual presentation of 
something in the distance that could be either a person or a post. Uddyotakara ar-
gues, following the sūtra, that in cases like this there are three individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions for doubt: (1) lack of awareness of a uniquely distin-
guishing property of the object being cognized; (2) awareness of its being qualified 
by a property compatible with various, exclusive property-bearers; and (3) lack of 
certainty from cognition or lack of cognition, which could settle the case.19 Doubt 
triggers a move to second-level reflection, since a cognition to which one would be 
entitled by the (presumed) operation of a pramāṇa loses such entitlement in the face 
of doubt.
Now, back to the question of degrees of warrant: as explained in leading ac-
counts, while doubt is spoken of a something that plagues a cognition or a tenet of 
some kind, it is ultimately subject-and situation-dependent, and therefore can change 
as the conditions of the epistemic subject change. My apparently veridical percep-
tual cognition that my friend Ben is in the park may be doubtful now, given the fog 
in the air or my distance from him. But a cognition with the same content, perceptu-
ally targeting that person under the qualifier “my friend Ben,” may not be doubtful if 
I close the gap a bit. Or, perhaps, it may be less doubtful. Here, the truth-value of the 
cognition is the same (I stipulate that they are both veridical cognitions, yathārtha). 
But the epistemic status of the cognition is different in the case where I am beset by 
unfavorable conditions which inhibit certainty and give rise to doubt. Thus, there is a 
range within which cognition, whether true or not, has varied epistemic status as it 
strikes the subject. Admittedly, this would need to be developed to fully account for 
a notion of degrees of warrant. Or perhaps it may be unpacked in terms other than 
warrant. But my suggestion is that the fundamental resources are there to handle the 
problem of degrees of normativity accorded to cognition. And in tandem with 
Nyāya’s approach to epistemology as meant to guide us in our pursuit of life’s goals, 
there may be ample scope to consider an informal metric of sorts by which the prag-
matic needs of a situation, coupled with the epistemic force of the cognition or belief 
in question, allow for action to be guided by less than certainty.20
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Now, the role of disagreement: it is particularly noteworthy that vipratipatti, op-
posing views, is recognized in NS 1.1.23 as the third trigger for doubt. Uddyotakara 
states that in cases of doubt caused by conflicting opinion, as opposed to something 
like unclear perceptual presentations as discussed above, contrary opinions or asser-
tions take the place of condition (2), the awareness of something’s being qualified by 
a property compatible with various property-bearers. Vātsyāyana’s example suggests 
a philosophically informed perspective, and not a mere contrary claim:
One school holds that there is an indwelling self. Another holds that there is no indwell-
ing self. It is impossible that both obtain simultaneously, and in the absence of a proof in 
support of either one, there is an absence of definitive ascertainment of the truth, which 
constitutes doubt. (NB 1.1.23; ND 241)
Peer disagreement thus triggers doubt. But how far to go with this? Given the 
ubiquity of well-known, opposed opinions among classical Indian thinkers, this 
could lead to a kind of philosophical skepticism of the sort developed by Feldman:
[There] are cases in which one is tempted to say that ‘reasonable people can disagree’ 
about the matter under discussion. In those cases, I think, the skeptical conclusion is the 
reasonable one: it is not the case that both points of view are reasonable, and it is not the 
case that one’s own point of view is somehow privileged. (Feldman 2006, p. 235)
This view, however, is not embraced by Nyāya, which in practice maintains en-
trenched opposition to other schools and thinkers who have similar philosophical 
acumen (indicating that they are likely to be epistemic peers) and who usually re-
main unconvinced of Nyāya’s position. But I have not found much discussion in the 
classical sources on when a challenger may be ignored without violating epistemic 
norms. Clearly, challenges that conform to the classically accepted notions of 
pramāṇa defeaters are legitimate. Other challenges, and particularly certain kinds of 
skepticism, are held to be unreasonable. Still, Nyāya does respond to the latter, trying 
to illustrate why they are unreasonable (charging them, for example, with pragmatic 
self-contradiction, or by use of arguments from the parasitism of falsity upon truth). 
Nyāya seems to hold that opposition to a position that has been successfully de-
fended need not trigger doubt unless relevant objections to undefended aspects of the 
position arise. Thus, while Phillips is correct that the role of disagreement’s impact on 
justification is not “entirely clear” (p. 101), we should take note of the fact that, from 
the sūtras on, Nyāya is aware of the way in which disagreement is a leading cause of 
doubt and cognitive review. Therefore, the resources to form an epistemology of dis-
agreement may be found elaborating on the leads within the tradition itself.
I would like to close by considering an issue that lingers in the background of 
many of our attempts to wrestle with Nyāya epistemology in the light of contempo-
rary thought: Nyāya’s apparent lack of sustained concern with agent-centered epis-
temic normativity or agent-justification, that is, with the assessment of an individual 
knower’s performance as an epistemic agent. By contrast, we see that from the early 
modern period, the Western tradition, as illustrated by Plantinga (1993, pp. 11–29), 
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exhibits a profound concern with the epistemic duties of individual knowers and the 
criteria to assess them thereby. Recognizing this internalist, individualist, and deon-
tological inheritance helps explain why it makes sense to us to be concerned with 
there could be situations of massive cognitive failure, where one can be radically 
wrong about most things, yet still be subjectively rational and thus justified. And 
while “justification” has had a remarkable range of meanings, historically it is still 
tethered to the basic question “why is it right to believe x?” Even after the recent rise 
of reliabilism, externalism, and various attempts to naturalize epistemology, we have 
again seen a return to the agent in the form of virtue epistemology, an epistemologi-
cal program that grounds cognitive success in agential competence exercised in ap-
propriate conditions.21 Against this background, some scholars of pramāṇa theory 
have bemoaned its apparent absence of concern with agents in knowledge-gathering 
practices.22 In other cases, when some suggest that agent-centered normativity is 
present, it seems more like an abstraction and suggestion of what should be there as 
en tailments of Nyāya’s views, rather than what is developed in the original thinkers 
themselves.
What to make of this apparent lacuna? I am inclined to hold out a bit and wait. 
By this I mean that perhaps this situation is akin to Nyāya’s defense of testimony, its 
process reliabilism, or its theory of default trust in cognition — things that may have 
seemed strange or out of place to many Western thinkers (owing largely to their own 
internalist, deontological, and individualist approach to epistemology), but to which 
the mainstream Western tradition finally caught up.23 Perhaps Nyāya’s restricted con-
cern with agent-centered epistemic normativity is a better approach. In a demon 
world we would be lost, subjective rationality be damned. Though one may be doing 
her best in such circumstances and perhaps be faultless from an internalist or deon-
tological perspective, she would fail to be a knower (pramātṛ), and therefore she does 
not partake of high-grade epistemic status. At the same time, following the lead of 
Phillips (and Patil, as well as others), we may identify and reflect on those aspects of 
cognitive practice where Nyāya locates some space for agent-centered epistemic 
normativity. I would suggest the following three.
1. In deliberate and reflective use of inference.
2. In sensitivity to the kinds of situations and conditions that trigger doubt and 
review of cognition.
3. In review and certification, which arise post-doubt.
Regarding deliberate and reflective inference, though Naiyāyikas do not normally 
express positive epistemic status in deontological language, as discussed by Phillips 
(pp. 14–15), they clearly hold that one should abide by the canons of right reasoning 
and recognize fallacies of various kinds.24 This is underscored by the care taken in 
the Nyāya literature, beginning with the sūtras themselves, to identify fallacies and 
argumentative dead-ends.
The importance of sensitivity to the kinds of situations and conditions that trigger 
doubt and review of cognition is evinced by Nyāya’s extensive discussions of 
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 epistemic defeaters of various sorts. Moreover, implicit in the treatment of doubt and 
review is the contention that one should be dubious of incoherent cognitive presen-
tations and instances of incoherence within one’s own cognitive structure. It is wrong 
to be careless or indifferent to such matters.25 There is a core personal responsibility 
expected of mature, competent epistemic agents. They must recognize and respond 
to instances of doxastic incoherence or potential defeaters (including, for example, 
the dubious authority of a testifier) when brought to attention, and likewise be sensi-
tive to incoherence within experience, withholding judgment about doubtful cogni-
tions until their status has been settled.26
Finally (as illustrated by Phillips), much of an epistemic agent’s status is deter-
mined by her performance in second-order practices, which involve review and con-
firmation of putatively veridical cognitions. If such review is carried out reasonably, 
according to norms of rational review, one is acting as a good epistemic agent.
Notes
Abbreviations
NB Nyāya-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. See Gotama et al. 2003. (Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya).
ND Nyāya-darśana, edited by Taranatha Nyāya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan 
Tarkatirtha. See Gotama et al. 2003 (Nyāyadarśanam: . . .).
NS Nyāya-sūtra of Gotama.
NV Nyāya-vārttika of Uddyotakara. See Gotama et al. 2003 (Uddyotkara’s 
Vārttika).
NVT Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra. See Gotama et al. 2003 
(Vācaspati Miśra’s Tātparyaṭīkā).
1   –   Let us note in passing that while Phillips suggests that nirṇaya is Nyāya’s techni-
cal term for this reflective, certified knowledge (pp. 5, 19, 106), the term has 
some fluidity in the original sources. NS 1.1.41 defines nirṇaya as the determi-
nation of an issue after reflection upon supporting and opposing considerations, 
which certainly supports Phillips’ usage. But commenting on the text, a number 
of leading Naiyāyikas expressly claim that nirṇaya can be the product of ground-
level unreflective epistemic practice. Indeed, it is in the specific context of ex-
plaining the concept of nirṇaya that early Naiyāyikas express their theory of 
default, unreflective justification. Vātsyāyana notes that in the act of perception 
(for example), an immediate, unreviewed cognition born of the contact be-
tween sense faculty and object is nirṇaya (NB 1.1.41). Uddyotakara is more 
explicit: “some claim that definitive ascertainment is simply inferential, that it is 
nothing more. We deny this. . . ; in the absence of inference, definitive ascer-
tainment may be produced as the result of the mere functioning of a pramāṇa” 
(NV 1.1.41; ND 333–334). My impression is that while clearly Nyāya identifies 
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two ways of gaining knowledge, corresponding to the two levels articulated by 
Phillips, there are not two clear and consistently employed terms used for the 
two kinds of knowledge.
2   –   Another Nyāya metaphor brings this point home: “A scale, which is a source of 
knowledge, may be an object of knowledge as well” (NS 2.1.16). Vātsyāyana 
comments that a bit of gold is an object of knowledge when weighed by a scale. 
But once its weight is securely ascertained, it may be used to determine whether 
other scales are properly calibrated. In the latter case, the scale itself is the ob-
ject of knowledge, which the bit of gold “measures.” Clearly, a reflective equi-
librium is in play here. There are a few relevant exceptions to this approach, 
pertaining to cognitions that are considered fundamentally unchallengeable; 
see Chakrabarti 1984 for discussion.
3   –   A final concern worth exploring, tied to Nyāya’s coherentism, is the question 
of svataḥ-prāmāṇya (“intrinsic veridicality”) versus parataḥ-prāmāṇya (“non- 
intrinsic veridicality”), briefly mentioned by Phillips (p. 134 n. 8). Mīmāṁsā 
and Nyāya champion the two views, respectively, meaning that for Mīmāṁsā 
an instance of cognition evinces its veridicality “from within,” independently of 
support added by other cognitions, while Nyāya holds that (with some impor-
tant exceptions) the veridicality of cognition is established within a tacit net-
work of support by other putatively pramāṇa-born cognitions. The two would, 
on the surface of things, seem to lean toward something like foundationalism 
and coherentism, respectively. What is particularly interesting given this distinc-
tion is that both Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā defend a default, unreflective entitlement 
to undoubted cognition, what Phillips describes as modest foundationalism. 
Given this, I would like briefly to discuss the considerations by which they re-
spectively come to this position because it illustrates the way in which a similar 
position may be developed by very different considerations.
  The foundation of the intrinsic position was laid by Śabara, the pioneering 
commentator on the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra, who argues that Vedic testimony produces 
cognitions with default prima facie justification simply due to its producing 
(avabodhayati) determinate, contentful cognitions (Śabara-bhāṣya 1.1.1.2). 
Mīmāṁsakas extend this principle to all putatively veridical presentational cog-
nition. As I understand it, their contention is that the nature of cognition is to 
reveal information, and as such there is incongruence between its revelatory 
nature and its being prima facie false or even doubted. External information 
could serve to falsify it, but is not needed to support it (see Arnold 2005, pp. 64–
65, for a summary of this argument; see Taber 1992 for a study of its develop-
ment in Kumārila and leading Bhāṭṭa thinkers). There are clear affinities between 
this approach and a line of thinking advanced by Burge (1993, p. 471), that “the 
very content of an intelligible message presented as true” has an a priori prima 
facie connection to truth, and is therefore worthy of default entitlement; per-
haps also affinities to Pryor’s notion of the “phenomenal force” of cognition, 
which underwrites default entitlement (2000, p. 536).
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  Nyāya’s defense of default entitlement to cognition tends to be more prag-
matic. As Phillips notes, Nyāya’s concern with epistemology has a deeply prag-
matic motivation: we are concerned with correct cognition because we want to 
achieve our life-aims (pp. 19–21). But if we start with doubt, we will waste our 
time mucking around in the foundations, unable to achieve our goals (see 
Vācaspati’s comments on the limits of doubt in NVT 1.1.5; ND 139). This may 
be fruitfully compared to the notion advanced by Enoch and Schechter (2008) 
that we are pragmatically justified in depending on our basic belief-forming 
methods because they are indispensable in our pursuit of rationally required 
projects. Also compare to similar remarks by Alston (1991, pp. 150, 168). Allied 
with this, Nyāya refutes default skepticism through its arguments from parasit-
ism, which try to establish that error and doubt are conceptually parasitical 
upon truth, and therefore trust in apparent truth is rightly our cognitive starting 
point (see Dasti 2012 for an exploration of these arguments).
4   –   NB, Introduction; ND 53–55. Vātsyāyana notes that the reason tarka is not an 
independent pramāṇa is that it does not independently establish the nature of 
the thing in question (anavadhāranāt). It provides consent (anujānāti) for one of 
two alternatives independently supported by apparent pramāṇas by illustrating 
problems with the other of the two alternatives.
5   –   While many published works have provided insights into structural features of 
Nyāya’s theory of knowledge, few have provided systemizations of the entire 
theory and, further, specifically engage with contemporary epistemology. Patil 
(2009, pp. 31–56) provides one of the few attempts in recent literature. (He 
does note, though, that he is primarily focusing on the overview given in the 
Nyāya textbook Tarkabhāṣā and in the pūrvapakṣas of Ratnakīrti, and does not 
claim to interpret the main lines of Nyāya thought in historical overview). In 
my opinion, his analysis of the main contours of Nyāya epistemology is largely 
right and is, for that matter, largely akin to that given, with more elaboration, by 
Phillips. But in the matter of framing Nyāya in the categories developed by con-
temporary epistemology, I do think that Phillips’ account is more apt, for the 
following reasons: (1) Patil differentiates between the two levels of Nyāya’s cog-
nitive practice by claiming that the ground level is reliabilist and the second-
level internalist and foundationalist, with the former providing knowledge but 
the later justification. But for Nyāya, the dependence on knowledge sources 
(and thus process reliabilism) exists in any instance of knowing, even reflective 
certificational knowledge. Our second-order certificational knowledge must 
also be the product of a reliable process, typically inference. Patil’s choice of 
nomenclature does not capture this as well as Phillips’ distinction between 
 externalism and internalism, while stressing that both take place within the 
domain of knowledge sources. (2) Patil’s use of “foundationalism” to distinguish 
the second level certificational practice does not sufficiently highlight the fact, to 
which Phillips calls attention, that the regress-stopping default trust in blemish-
free presentational cognition operates on both levels equally. Finally, (3) Patil 
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argues that Nyāya takes justification, what is produced by second-level success-
ful review of cognition, to be “the property of an agent and only derivatively a 
property of an awareness-event.” While he is right to be concerned with the 
status of the agent in acts of knowing (something arguably underdeveloped by 
Naiyāikas, as we discuss further below), it is not clear that Nyāya speaks of in-
dividuals as “justified.” Phillips rightly notes that agent-centered attention to 
reasons governs the second level certificational practice, but the primary con-
cern throughout is the epistemic status of the original cognition itself.
  I want to underscore that these criticisms are minor, as Patil’s analysis is on 
the whole accurate and deeply insightful. But in the choice between the two 
competing applications of contemporary epistemological terminology, I would 
endorse Phillips.
6   –   Indeed, as mentioned by Phillips, and expertly discussed in Chakrabarti 2010, 
Nyāya solves the problem of induction by appeal to perception: we have the 
capacity to grasp many universals by means of (an admittedly special) percep-
tual capacity. And since universals underwrite causal laws, we gain cognitive 
access to laws of nature through such perception.
7   –   For example, Phillips criticizes Nyāya’s claim that the capacity of language 
known as dhvani (“suggestion”) is nothing more than a kind of inference (p. 94).
8   –   One may argue that the original statement by the authoritative speaker only 
provided a general understanding of what cheerleaders are, but not the knowl-
edge that “these very people are cheerleaders,” which requires perceptual ex-
perience. But this would be a confusion. Consider another example: we infer 
fire on the hill, and then walk over and actually see it. As Nyāya would say, we 
first have inferential cognition and then a convergence of pramāṇas through the 
second, perceptual cognition, which reinforces the first. Why not treat the two 
parts of what is taken to be analogy in the same way?
9   –   We may note here that Phillips adds an appendix to the volume which is a 
translation of the Analogy chapter of Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmaṇi. It indeed 
serves to illustrate the rigor and philosophical cogency of Gaṅgeśa’s analytic 
method. I do wonder though, why this, of all options, would be chosen as the 
text by which readers may get their first engagement in reading Nyāya directly. 
Other portions of Gaṅgeśa, like sections of his Prāmāṇya-vāda (“Analysis of 
Veridicality”) would have, I think, served better in speaking to the primary con-
cerns of epistemologists and students of epistemology who will read Phillips’ 
book. I would advise readers interested in more relevant portions of Gaṅgeśa’s 
work to consult Phillips and Ramanuja Tatacharya 2004. Let me add that the 
inclusion of the chapter on analogy perhaps serves a larger aim than that of this 
present book: to contribute to Phillips’ project of ultimately making the entirety 
of Gaṅgeśa’s text available to the English-reading world.
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10   –   Indeed, one argument advanced against analogy by Bhāsarvajña appeals to the 
fact that in common speech, we recognize our cognitions to be produced by 
perception, inference, and testimony, but never by a specific faculty called 
“analogy.” See Chattopadhyay 2009, p. 156.
11   –   We may note that here Nyāya anticipates Alston, who suggests that “there are 
fundamental considerations that mark out, for each process token, a type that is 
something like its ‘natural kind’ ” and that “by virtue of being a functional map-
ping of input features onto output content, [a reliable process] has a built in 
generality that is provided by the function . . . [and] is the one defined by the 
function, which is in turn defined by a certain way of going from input features 
to output features” (2000, pp. 360, 363). Conee and Feldman (2000, p. 377) 
push back against this approach, arguing that individuation by natural kinds still 
fails to resist the generality problem: process tokens may belong to many natu-
ral kinds, and therefore there is no compelling reason to claim that such tokens 
belong to a single kind for the purpose of evaluating reliability. This does not 
seem like much of a problem to me. As Vātsyāyana remarks in his comments on 
NS 2.1.20 (quoted by Phillips on pp. 18–19), we do tend to have a fairly good, 
intuitive handle on the most important natural kinds to which pramāṇas belong 
for the purposes of evaluation. When gauging the reliability of my teacher’s 
testimony, I do not become confused by the fact that it belongs to the category 
“sound vibration” or “things said within a building.” We are not, as Alston re-
marks, “awash in a sea of indeterminacy” (2000, p. 360).
12   –   This concern has been voiced by others, including Oetke (2003, pp. 207, 214–
215), who argues that “a ‘binary’ notion of validity, i.e. a notion which admits 
only for the two values ‘valid’ and ‘non-valid’ is insufficient. . . .”
13   –   See Plantinga 1993, pp. 4, 109–110, and Alston 1999, p. 223.
14   –   bahudhā parīkṣyamāṇam tattvaṁ suniścitataraṁ bhavati.
15   –   See Dasti and Phillips 2010.
16   –   A further place to look, as suggested by Phillips (p. 101), is in Nyāya’s employ-
ment of tarka as a method of addressing the status of a disputed cognition by 
appeal to issues of coherence. See Ganeri 2001, pp. 151–152, for a sensitive 
treatment of this role of tarka.
17   –   Uddyotakara thus remarks that doubt is “an essential component of investiga-
tion (vicāra-aṅga)” (NV 1.1.23). Further, “while there is no rule (niyama) that 
doubt must precede definitive ascertainment (nirṇaya), it must precede investi-
gation (vicāra)” (NV 2.1.1). Reflecting on the traditional ordering of Nyāya’s 
topics of study (NS 1.1.1), Udayana suggests that doubt is listed before the indi-
vidual steps of reasoning because doubt is itself the occasion for careful reason-
ing (Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-pariṣuddhi of Udayana 1.1.23 [Udayana 1996]). 
For a classic treatment of doubt in Nyāya, see Mohanty 1965. Also see Potter 
1977, pp. 170–172.
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18   –   samāna-aneka-dharma-upapatter vipratipatter upalabdhy-anupalabdhy-
avyavasthātaś ca viśeṣa-apekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ. In my translation, I have 
followed Uddyotakara’s interpretation.
19   –   While the third condition may seem superfluous, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati 
offer the following example in its defense: A person visually apprehends a tree 
at close range. After distancing himself from the tree, he now sees it as some-
thing tall but otherwise unclear. He no longer apprehends the properties that 
distinguish it, and he does apprehend a property that it shares with other things 
(tallness). In this, the first two conditions are met. But no doubt arises, since his 
former decisive cognition prevents uncertainty. This last condition importantly 
underscores the role of background information as it impinges on occurent 
cognition.
20   –   Jayanta seems to be quite sensitive to the role of pragmatic concerns in relation 
to doubt, review, and decision making. Among other things, he notes that for 
common endeavors that are easy to undertake, cognitive review is not as impor-
tant as those in which the endeavor is strenuous or the stakes are higher in some 
other way ( Jayanta Bhaṭṭa 1969, p. 481). Also relevant is the following passage 
from the Tarkabhāṣā: “Someone acts on the basis of a doubtful cognition, and 
later, finding water or the like, determines that the original cognition was ve-
ridical” (kaścit tu sandehāt pravṛttaḥ pravṛtti-uttara-kāle jalādi-pratilambhe sati 
prāmāṇyam avadhārayatīti) (Keśava Miśra 1979, p. 150).
21   –   Sosa (2007) is paradigmatic. Given that Sosa’s epistemology also recognizes 
two tiers of knowledge, animal and reflective, there seems to be scope for com-
parison and engagement between his view and Nyāya’s.
22   –   Notably Oetke (2003), whose concerns range wider than those that I mention 
here. As an aside, let us note, however, that Nyāya consistently speaks of know-
ing as a manifestation of the individual’s agency. Knowledge (jñāna, etc.) may 
be a guṇa and not a karman for Nyāya, but the processes that give rise to knowl-
edge are clearly agential. Nyāya tends to develop this point in terms of the 
metaphysics of selfhood (e.g., in the anti-Sāṁkhya polemics of the third book of 
the Nyāya-sūtra) and without robustly connecting it to its epistemology. See my 
“Nyāya’s Self as Agent and Knower” (Dasti forthcoming) for discussion.
23   –   For example, given the recent explosion of interest in testimony within analytic 
epistemology, it is interesting to note the embarrassment with which Surendra-
nath Dasgupta mentions the subject in his celebrated History almost a century ago:
Śabda or word [testimony] is regarded as separate means of proof by most of the recog-
nized Indian systems of thought excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, Cārvāka and Vaiśeṣika. A 
discussion of this topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore 
omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the Nyāya, and the Sāṁkhya-Yoga 
systems. . . . Evidently a discussion of these matters has but little value with us, though it 
was a very favorite theme of debate in the old days of India. (Dasgupta 1975 [1922], 
p. 394)
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24   –   What is normally translated as inference, anumāna, may be either an immedi-
ate, unreflective, non-testimonial awareness of something beyond current per-
ceptual cognition, generated by successfully navigating conceptual relations, or 
it may be a deliberate consideration of proof and entailment, terminating in 
awareness of an unperceived fact or object. The first case seems much like 
Dretske’s (1994) notion of indirect perception as it occurs in a sub-personal, 
immediate way. In the latter case, agent-centered normativity has a more prom-
inent role, since an agent must actively consider inferential relations, entail-
ments, and defeaters. See Vātsyāyana’s closing comments on NS 2.1.38, that 
when one infers poorly, “the fault is with the person himself.”
25   –   This claim needs qualification. There are surely instances where a subject is not 
blameworthy for her insensitivity to relevant defeaters, owing to cognitive de-
fects for which she is not responsible (e.g., blindness or poor training).
26   –   In contexts of debate, Naiyāyikas express disapproval at opponents for not 
abiding by what are taken to be norms of right reasoning and sensitivity to de-
featers. For example, Vācaspati chides an interlocutor who rejects Nyāya’s posi-
tion without proper argument: “you cannot simply drive [my argument] away 
with a stick” (NVT 4.1.21). In other words, rationality dictates that the opponent 
provides sufficient argumentation in support of his rejection. In private conver-
sation, Stephen Phillips has called attention to the fact that even if one’s infer-
ential cognition is veridical, Nyāya holds that awareness of a well-supported, 
undefeated counterargument (sat-prati-pakṣa) is enough to reduce it to apramā, 
non-knowledge.
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